“Traditional” and “Non-traditional” Islam in the North Caucasus: What Next?

The “Caucasian Knot” has translated the online discussion “Traditional” and “Non-traditional” Islam in the North Caucasus: What Next?", held in April 2019, for our English-speaking readers. Russian experts on this topic, such as Denis Sokolov, Irina Starodubrovskaya, Alexey Gunya and others, participated in the discussion. A lot of regional experts, Ziyautdin Uvaisov and Anna Glyants among them, also took part in the discussion. They emphasized that intra-Muslim conflicts now heavily influence a lot of things, both in the domestic and international policy agenda. Online discussions in Russian are regularly held by the “Caucasian Knot” in the "Discussions" board section. The "Caucasian Knot" is planning to translate next discussions into English as well.
moderator
moderator
Apr.11, 11:26
“Traditional” and “Non-traditional” Islam in the North Caucasus: What Next?

The online discussion starts at 9:30 AM Moscow time, April 13. All interested are welcome to join the discussion and ask questions.

Today in Russia, they make a distinction between the so-called “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam, with the former represented within the system of Muslim spiritual directorates. Several “umbrella” organizations have been established to regulate relations with “official” Islam in Russia, their leaders representing the Muslims at national-level events that require participation of representatives of the Muslim community of Russia. These are: Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (CSDM), headed by Talgat Tadzhuddin, Council of Muftis of Russia (CMR), headed by Ravil Gaynutdin, Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia (MSBR), headed by Mufti Albir Krganov, and Coordinating Council of Muslims of the North Caucasus, headed by Ismail Berdiyev, Mufti of Karachay-Cherkessia.

At the same time, “non-traditional” Islam is developing swiftly: youth jamaats (communities) of “new Muslims”, Muslims who do not follow any of the four Madhhabs, Dagestan Salafi association “Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah”, Madhalists (moderate Salafis coming for cooperation with authorities) and the so-called “ikhwanized” Salafis (Salafis influenced by ideas of known Islamic theologian Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi from Qatar). The life of the Islamic community of the Caucasus is extremely dynamic with numerous religious groups constantly moving from conflicts to attempts to build bridges with each other.

Those groups may have leaders and opinions different from those of imams and muftis.

In the course of our discussion at the Caucasian Knot on April 13, we will consider the following issues:

1.   Muftiyats and informal Muslim networks. Report by А. Yarlykapov

2.   Activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.

3.   Informal networks of Caucasian Muslims outside the jurisdiction of spiritual directorates. What forms of self-organization pf Muslims exist beyond the spiritual directorates? Informal Muslim networks in Europe.

4.   Prospects for relations between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus.

The online discussion will start 9:30 AM Moscow time. All interested are invited to join the discussion and ask questions.
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 09:31
Dear colleagues, speakers, readers of the Caucasian Knot! We begin our work. The discussion will last until 11 AM Moscow time. Please, observe the rules of discussion and abstain from personal and insulting remarks.  

Let me introduce our speakers:  

Ahmet Yarlykapov, Senior Fellow, Candidate of Historical Sciences, MSUIR, Moscow

Karena Avedissyan, American University of Armenia

Aleksei Gunya, Doctor of Geography, Institute of Geography, RAS, Moscow

Evgeni Ivanov, Graduate Student, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Aleko Kvakhadze, Research Fellow, Rondeli Foundation, Georgia

Lidia Kurbanova, Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Chechen State University

Muhammad Magomedov, journalist, press secretary of Sunni mosque “Tangim”, Makhachkala

Aude Merlin, Free University of Brussels

Denis Sokolov, Senior Adviser, CSIS, Washington

Irina Starodubrovskaya, PhD in Economics, head of School of Political Economy and Regional Development, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, Moscow

Magomed Sunzhenski

Tushta

Ziyautdin Uvaysov, lawyer, human rights defender, Makhachkala

Mark Youngman, University of Birmingham, UK

Anna Glyants, Free University of Brussels

Now let me give the floor to Ahmet Yarlykapov. Please, present your report. 

achmady
achmady
Apr. 13, 09:31
The formation of the system of Muslim Spiritual Directorates started during the rule of Russian Empress Catherine II, but did not reach its logical end during the Czarist period. Such important regions as the North Caucasus and Central Asia factually remained beyond the influence of muftiyats. The Bolsheviks gave the final shape to the system by establishing separate spiritual directorates for the Muslims of the North Caucasus and Central Asia – a step that the Russian empire did not dare to make.

On the one hand, the post-soviet Russia abolished the rigid system when there were only 2 or 3 spiritual directorates for the entire country, so today almost every region in Russia has its “own” muftiyat or even several muftiyats. On the other hand, a de-facto system has been formed, where a community may be allowed to build/operate its own mosque only if it is attached to one of the muftiyats. Furthermore, regions do their best to secure loyalty of appropriate muftis using different ways to get rid of imams disliked by the muftis. If this does not work, they simply form a loyal muftiyat, just as it happened in the Stavropol Territory, where the authorities were at odds with Ismail Berdiyev, Mufti of the Spiritual Directorate of Karachay-Cherkessia and the Stavropol Territory. Targeted steps were taken with active participation of Stavropol authorities, which resulted in establishment of Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Stavropol Territory in 2010.

A number of “umbrella” organizations were established to regulate relations with “official” Islam in Russia, their leaders representing the Muslims at national-level events that require participation of representatives of the Muslim community of Russia. In the first place, it is the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (CSDM), headed by Talgat Tadzhuddin and the Council of Muftis of Russia (CMR), headed by Ravil Gaynutdin. Another umbrella organization that is being promoted today is the Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia (MSBR), established in 2016 and headed by Mufti Albir Krganov. Despite Krganov’s insignificant influence among Muslims, MSBR has generous financing, Krganov is invited to all official events, and it is evident that all North Caucasian muftis are insistently recommended to cooperate with him. The fourth umbrella organization is the Coordinating Council of Muslims of the North Caucasus (CCMNC), headed by Ismail Berdiyev, Mufti of Karachay-Cherkessia. Neither CCMNC nor Berdiyev play any important role in the bureaucratic infighting at the federal level. Moscow simply needs someone to represent the Muslims of the Caucasus on holidays. Even though, in contrast with the CSDM, muftiyats entering the CCMNC are fully independent, the CCMNC chair does not interfere with the process of election of regional muftis.

This cohesive system supported by local and federal authorities implies that corresponding Spiritual Directorates have control over the Muslim communities (jamaats) under their “jurisdiction”. However, in real life it becomes more problematic for muftis to maintain control of the situation in the territories formally falling under their jurisdiction. Even the appointment of loyal imams to mosques fails to help the Spiritual Directorates to regain control over them. The issue is not that “official” imams and muftis have little resources or authority. There are rather powerful structures in the North Caucasus, like the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Dagestan (SDMD) with its developed infrastructure, influential theologians and executives and sufficient resources. It is rather that the processes in the modern Islamic Ummah are highly dynamic. The Islamic community becomes increasingly diverse in all regions; the real life of the Islamic community goes within the jamaats and is out of control of official spiritual directorates. Informal Islamic networks gain a more active role in the Islamic community, their leaders often having more respect and authority than official imams of mosques do. Moreover, the networks not necessarily consist of so-called “non-traditional” Muslims. They often include followers of “traditional” for the region Shafi’i and Hanafi madhhabs, critically disposed to local practices (particularly to funerary ritualism). Discourse surrounding various “deviations” of which the opposed groups of followers of “traditional” madhhabs accuse each other, result in serious disagreement between them. The disagreement often, but not always lies between generations: there may be both younger and older generations on both sides. Interestingly, the appointment of an unpopular or uninfluential imam does not bolster influence of “official” Muslim structures, but instead boosts authority of informal Islamic leaders.

Informal networks play a special role in organizing the life of Caucasian Muslim migrants by taking care of most crucial things, including arrangement of Islamic infrastructure, provision of halal products (supplying halal meat, opening halal cafes, etc.). Many Caucasian Muslims, especially young ones, start practicing Islam in migration. The reislamization processes enhance the diversity of Caucasian Muslim communities. Speaking about the migrant communities of Caucasian Muslims, there are two obvious key players there, actively promoting their influence: SDMD and Sufis of Dagestan and Ramzan Kadyrov. The latter rather skilfully promotes an image of an informal but influential leader of Muslims of Russia; the image that is easily recognized in the Gulf countries. The Dagestan Sufis try to enhance their influence through their own networks, media (in particular, the newspaper “As-Salam”) and work with regional authorities. It is noteworthy that these two key players, having quite official status in the North Caucasus, act as informal networks in other regions of Russia (certainly, using all the advantages of their official status).

Putting it all together, formal leadership and formal control of spiritual directorates and imam appointments does not necessarily lead to actual control of jamaats. Such official “control” normally ignores the diverse nature of modern jamaats, thus excluding significant Muslim groups and their informal leaders from cooperation processes. Importance of dialogue and cooperation between different groups within jamaats is manifestly obvious, but unfortunately, simple solutions achievable through appointment of loyal imams remain prevalently tempting. The situation when factually autonomous communities integrated into informal networks remain under formal “control” of an official muftiyat and its imams can hold for a long time. Generally speaking, that was the case for the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. It is important that the parallel existence should not lead to conflicts and use of force. Broadly speaking, informal Muslim networks tend to be increasingly important on a global scale alongside with growing diversity of regional Islamic communities, and “official” structures will have to face this fact sooner or later.
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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 09:36
I think that Ahmet has captured a very important feature of the current state of “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam. This is not only about a conflict of identities, which indeed is less conspicuous in this case. To a greater degree, this is about functional differences. If official Islam is basically built in official structures, non-traditional or unofficial Islam is associated with informal networks of mutual support. Of course, this distinction is not that sharp. In some cases, conflict of identities still has significance and support networks do form around some official Islamic structures. However, functional difference is one of the major trends aptly noted by Ahmet.
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 09:42
The major problem is that the declared separation of religion and State actually does not work in this case and official structures seek to take control of religious structures, eventually causing their alienation.
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Evgeny Ivanov
Apr. 13, 09:42
Sunni Islam as such does not imply a hierarchy similar to that of the Russian Orthodox Church or Christianity in general. Would it be fair to say that one of the reasons why they refuse to affiliate with Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) is that they seek to resort to the original Islamic tradition, to clean it from the control institutions offered by the state?
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ALEXEI GUNYA
Apr. 13, 09:43
I’d like to thank Ahmet for the detailed review. We see a revolutionary situation here, when “elites” are bureaucratized and can’t control the situation, while “people” don’t want to be under the authority of the stagnant administration. In my opinion though, the number of “people” striving for modernization is relatively small, but this is not the main thing. Development has always been propelled by small groups. What solution can be offered – modernization of administration of spiritual life?   
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 09:44
We cannot assert univocally that the Sunnis have no vertical. It is not so. The Sunnis do welcome vertical self-government system, which is self-organized and not imposed from the outside.
achmady
ACHMADY
Apr. 13, 09:45
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV Sunni Islam as such does not imply a hierarchy similar to that of the Russian Orthodox Church or Christianity in general. Would it be fair to say that one of the reasons why they refuse to affiliate with Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) is that they seek to resort to the original Islamic tradition, to clean it from the control institutions offered by the state? Yes, it is so on a large scale. The system of Spiritual Directorates was established in order to create some structures acceptable for the imperial power that would help to build relations with Muslims.
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DENIS SOKOLOV
Apr. 13, 09:45
Ahmet quite rightly mentioned the extension of influence of the Chechen and Dagestan muftiyats outside the North Caucasus. It would be more correct to say of influence of Kadyrov’s network and the SDMD. The former’s influence in and outside Russia via criminal networks and security agencies qualitatively differs from practices of the Dagestan muftiyat.

I would add to the list the Council of Muftis and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in the Asian Part of Russia (SDMAPR), joining some regional muftiyats and individual communities. The authority of such leaders as Nafigula Ashirov goes beyond the Muslim communities of the Volga region.

Furthermore, as a result of massive educational migration of Russian Muslims to Turkey, Europe, Egypt, etc., an influential network of graduates of Islamic universities has been formed.

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MAGOMED SUNZHENSKY
Apr. 13, 09:47
Ahmad, logic suggests that there can be only one jamaat in one territory, but what shall we understand by jamaat’s composition? Does it include all “ethnic Muslims” or only practicing Muslims, or does it mean something else?  
achmady
ACHMADY
Apr. 13, 09:48
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI We cannot assert univocally that the Sunnis have no vertical. It is not so. The Sunnis do welcome vertical self-government system, which is self-organized and not imposed from the outside. To me, the principle of electivity is of great importance alongside with self-organization.
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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 09:48
Quotation: ALEXEI GUNYA I’d like to thank Ahmet for the detailed review. We see a revolutionary situation here, when “elites” are bureaucratized and can’t control the situation, while “people” don’t want to be under the authority of the stagnant administration. In my opinion though, the number of “people” striving for modernization is relatively small, but this is not the main thing. Development has always been propelled by small groups. What solution can be offered – modernization of administration of spiritual life?   
In fact, I think that the solution lies in ensuring the proper implementation of the constitutional provision on freedom of belief, in refusal from dividing Muslims into “right” and “wrong” because of their religious beliefs. The only thing that is really important is whether they break secular state’s laws.
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Madina181
Apr. 13, 09:48
The transparent world with its new communication mode will enhance the capacity of horizontal communication networks of “ordinary” Muslims, and if official Muslim “centres” fail to react more sensitively and timely to their attitudes and do not try to build a dialogue with them, the probability of their propensity to conflict will become higher.
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denis sokolov
Apr. 13, 09:49
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI The major problem is that the declared separation of religion and State actually does not work in this case and official structures seek to take control of religious structures, eventually causing their alienation.
The irony is that it is difficult to avoid this. Politicians, executives and law-enforcers will always try to use religious institutions and religious leaders. Some (or even many) religious leaders, not only in Russia, cannot resist the temptation to use the State for their own benefit.  
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 09:49
Quotation: ACHMADY
!!! Quote: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI We cannot assert univocally that the Sunnis have no vertical. It is not so. The Sunnis do welcome vertical self-government system, which is self-organized and not imposed from the outside. Quotation: ACHMADY To me, the principle of electivity is of great importance alongside with self-organization.
Electivity is self-organization. Seizure of power is a possible development in the State context, and when Muslims have no State institution, as it is the case in Russia, they have no choice but self-organization based on electivity, and all attempts to impose some structures from above are doomed to failure without the grassroots support. !!!!
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Evgeny Ivanov
Apr. 13, 09:50
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI We cannot assert univocally that the Sunnis have no vertical. It is not so. The Sunnis do welcome vertical self-government system, which is self-organized and not imposed from the outside.
 Thank you!

Yes, this is what I meant in general. Could you give a more detailed account of this? As far as I know, Sufis have a hierarchy of saints headed by qutb. What about other branches of Islam?

achmady
achmady
Apr. 13, 09:50
This is a very good question. Yes, formally, one cathedral mosque gathers one jamaat on Fridays. But in reality, this jamaat consists of different groups – Hanafites, Shafiites, Sufis, those, whom they call Salaphites, etc., and here we certainly discuss jamaat as a community of believing and practicing Muslims.
Quotation: MAGOMED SUNZHENSKY Ahmad, logic suggests that there can be only one jamaat in one territory, but what shall we understand by jamaat’s composition? Does it include all “ethnic Muslims” or only practicing Muslims, or does it mean something else?  
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Anne Le Huerou
Apr. 13, 09:51
Thank you for the very interesting report. Here is my question: you mentioned reislamization of young migrants, but I’d like to understand the direction of this process: I mean, do religious practices in migration influence practices in the North Caucasus or vice versa? Or both? And how it happens?
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 09:51
Quotation: DENIS SOKOLOV
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI The major problem is that the declared separation of religion and State actually does not work in this case and official structures seek to take control of religious structures, eventually causing their alienation.
The irony is that it is difficult to avoid this. Politicians, executives and law-enforcers will always try to use religious institutions and religious leaders. Some (or even many) religious leaders, not only in Russia, cannot resist the temptation to use the State for their own benefit.  
Indeed, this problem exists both in Muslim and non-Muslim states; but such puppet leaders don’t have people’s support.
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 09:52
I also think it’s very important to demonstrate the existing differences in the institutional arrangement of the religious field. As my colleagues have already mentioned, while the jamaat institution is embedded directly in the Islamic doctrine, the muftiyat institution is a result of historical development of State regulation of relations with Muslim population. To me an important aspect is that “professionalization” of clergy is not regulated among the Sunnis, nor is the difference between an ordinary member and a leader of a community.

Besides, speaking about differences within various branches of Islam, I’d like to underline that religious practices of the Sufis are largely oriented to observation and maintenance of the hierarchy inside tariqa. In communities controlled by muftiyats, this hierarchy is duplicated by a branchy bureaucratic structure (see the practices of appointing imams in districts, “distribution” of murids among sheikhs, etc.). The relationships between ustads and murids are also regulated. In Salafi communities and in some Sufi communities independent from the SDMD, appointments of imams and other religious authorities largely depend on decisions of jamaats of concrete mosques.

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DENIS SOKOLOV
Apr. 13, 09:53
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: DENIS SOKOLOV
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI The major problem is that the declared separation of religion and State actually does not work in this case and official structures seek to take control of religious structures, eventually causing their alienation.
The irony is that it is difficult to avoid this. Politicians, executives and law-enforcers will always try to use religious institutions and religious leaders. Some (even many) religious leaders, not only in Russia, cannot resist the temptation to use the State for their own benefit. . 
Indeed, this problem exists both in Muslim and non-Muslim states; but such puppet leaders don’t have people’s support.
I broadly agree with this, but sometimes imams, built in the State machinery, find ways to attract young people using resources and social elevators.
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 09:53
Quotation: Evgeny Ivanov
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI We cannot assert univocally that the Sunnis have no vertical. It is not so. The Sunnis do welcome vertical self-government system, which is self-organized and not imposed from the outside.
 Thank you!

Yes, this is what I meant in general. Could you give a more detailed account of this? As far as I know, Sufis have a hierarchy of saints headed by qutb. What about other branches of Islam?

The Sunnis may either have a system of territorial structures, when residents of a certain territory elect a leader, who guides them in religious matters, or they may form membership-based jamaats.
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 09:55
Quotation: DENIS SOKOLOV
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: DENIS SOKOLOV
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI The major problem is that the declared separation of religion and State actually does not work in this case and official structures seek to take control of religious structures, eventually causing their alienation.
The irony is that it is difficult to avoid this. Politicians, executives and law-enforcers will always try to use religious institutions and religious leaders. Some (even many) religious leaders, not only in Russia, cannot resist the temptation to use the State for their own benefit.  
Indeed, this problem exists both in Muslim and non-Muslim states; but such puppet leaders don’t have people’s support.
I broadly agree with this, but sometimes imams, built in the State machinery, find ways to attract young people using resources and social elevators.
Yes, and an imam built in the state machinery is not always the one who has to “work” for officials. Just on the contrary, officials often have to look up to those who enjoy community’s support.
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ALEXEI GUNYA
Apr. 13, 09:56
It is a complicated question whether Muslims can use the existing self-regulation mechanisms to improve the self-government structures in line with the changing reality. The answer may be affirmative, if constitutional freedom of belief is guaranteed (as Irina mentioned). However, there may be reservations about this taking into consideration deep rooting in shadow economy, clientelism, etc. (comment by Denis). All this can lead to profound conflicts.  
achmady
ACHMADY
Apr. 13, 09:56
Quotation: ANNE LE HUEROU Thank you for the very interesting report. Here is my question: you mentioned reislamization of young migrants, but I’d like to understand the direction of this process: I mean, do religious practices in migration influence practices in the North Caucasus or vice versa? Or both? And how it happens?
Religion and self-organization become more significant in migration and many young people, who used to be indifferent to religion, start practicing it. Much depends on young men’s environment and networking – there can be relatives, friends and acquaintances who had migrated before. Influence of practices is mutual in both directions – from migration to the North Caucasus and vice versa. Ways of influence are diverse – for example, through networks of acquaintances, or through SDMD networks, etc.
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Madina181
Apr. 13, 09:56
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI The major problem is that the declared separation of religion and State actually does not work in this case and official structures seek to take control of religious structures, eventually causing their alienation.
It seems like the official religious structures, attracted by accessibility of administrative resources, willingly build in the state machinery’s power pyramid, and often defend interests of jamaats in name only.
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DENIS SOKOLOV
Apr. 13, 09:56
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS I also think it’s very important to demonstrate the existing differences in the institutional arrangement of the religious field. As my colleagues have already mentioned, while the jamaat institution is embedded directly in the Islamic doctrine, the muftiyat institution is a result of historical development of State regulation of relations with Muslim population. To me an important aspect is that “professionalization” of clergy is not regulated among the Sunnis, just as the difference between an ordinary member and a leader of a community.

Besides, speaking about differences within various branches of Islam, I’d like to underline that religious practices of the Sufis are largely oriented to observation and maintenance of the hierarchy inside tariqa. In communities controlled by muftiyats, this hierarchy is duplicated by a branchy bureaucratic structure (see the practices of appointing imams in districts, “distribution” of murids among sheikhs, etc.). The relationships between ustads and murids are also regulated. In Salafi communities and in some Sufi communities independent from the SDMD, appointments of imams and other religious authorities largely depend on decisions of jamaats of concrete mosques.

After all, distribution of murids among sheikhs is a matter of healthy competition, of course, if only murids are not distributed according to their “residence registration” like patients of outpatient clinics. State support is definitely important for sheikhs too)))
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ALEXEI GUNYA
Apr. 13, 09:57
Quotation: MADINA181
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI The major problem is that the declared separation of religion and State actually does not work in this case and official structures seek to take control of religious structures, eventually causing their alienation.
It seems like official religious structures, attracted by accessibility of administrative resources, willingly build in the state machinery’s power pyramid, and often defend interests of jamaats in name only.
Unconsciously to a certain extent...
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MAGOMED SUNZHENSKY
Apr. 13, 09:57
Quotation: ACHMADY
Quotation: MAGOMED SUNZHENSKY Ahmad, logic suggests that there can be only one jamaat in a territory, but what shall we understand by jamaat’s composition? Does it include all “ethnic Muslims” or only practicing Muslims, or does it mean something else? Quotation: ACHMADY This is a very good question. Yes, formally, one cathedral mosque gathers one jamaat on Fridays. But in reality, this jamaat consists of different groups – Hanafites, Shafiites, Sufis, those, whom they call Salaphites, etc., and here we certainly discuss jamaat as a community of believing and practicing Muslims.  
But in reality, given the strategy of the mentioned key players or those who contest for influence, it concerns all “nominal” (nonpracticing or even irreligious) Muslim, since in practice it’s not only about spiritual influence, but also about “business” and “political” influence.  
Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 09:58
So, here are the key takeaways from Ahmet’s report:  

1. Formal leadership and formal control of spiritual directorates and appointments of imams do not mean that the MSDs have real control of jamaats.  

2. At this point, significant Muslim groups and their informal leaders are excluded from cooperation.  

3. The situation when factually autonomous communities integrated into informal networks remain under formal “control” of an official muftiyat and its imams can hold for a long time.  

4. It is important that the parallel existence should not lead to conflicts and use of force. Broadly speaking, informal Muslim networks tend to be increasingly important on a global scale alongside with growing diversity of regional Islamic communities, and “official” structures will have to face this fact sooner or later.

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KARINA
Apr. 13, 09:58

From the viewpoint of an outside observe, it appears that the choice between “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam is not so much the issue of belief as the issue of choosing between two very different methods of expressing political identity. In Russia’s non-transparent political system with restricted articulation of alternative values, Islam can give people a chance to choose who they want to be.

Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 09:59
Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 10:00
Quotation: DENIS SOKOLOV
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS I also think it’s very important to demonstrate the existing differences in the institutional arrangement of the religious field. As my colleagues have already mentioned, while the jamaat institution is embedded directly in the Islamic doctrine, the muftiyat institution is a result of historical development of State regulation of relations with Muslim population. To me an important aspect is that “professionalization” of clergy is not regulated among the Sunnis, no is the difference between an ordinary member and a leader of a community.

Besides, speaking about differences within various branches of Islam, I’d like to underline that religious practices of the Sufis are largely oriented to observation and maintenance of the hierarchy inside tariqa. In communities controlled by muftiyats, this hierarchy is duplicated by a branchy bureaucratic structure (see the practices of appointing imams in districts, “distribution” of murids among sheikhs, etc. The relationships between ustads and murids are also regulated. In Salafi communities and in some Sufi communities independent from the SDMD, appointments of imams and other religious authorities largely depend on decisions of jamaats of concrete mosques.

After all, distribution of murids among sheikhs is a matter of healthy competition, of course, if only murids are not distributed according to their “residence registration” like patients of outpatient clinics. State support is definitely important for sheikhs too)))
Thank you, Denis! I should have specified that I was talking about the practice of distribution of murids among three sheikhs in Dagestan, who are the adherents of Sheikh Said Afandi al-Chirkawi. At least in 2016, informers mentioned the geographic distribution practice, when residents of mountain Hunzah and Botlikh districts “had” to visit ustaz Mansuril Mohammed Afandi in the village of Inkhelo, people from the lowlands were to visit Mufti of Dagestan Ahmad Haji Abdullayev in Makhachkala, while other murids of Southern Dagestan went to Sheikh Abdulja lilu-afandi Karanayski in Buynaksk. They were not prohibited to visit the sheikhs freely though, but I regarded it as a manifestation of “bureaucratization” of religious institutions by SDMD’s behest.
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DENIS SOKOLOV
Apr. 13, 10:07
This is surely a very broad question. It can be noted that Islamic activism effectively uses all modern activism practices, including social media, mass media and civic protests. Sometimes it is very interesting to analyse where ends the collective action typical for rural community and starts the civic activity typical for urban population,

As far as education is concerned, it is more interesting to see what is going on in this sphere outside Russia today. One of the most remarkable educational projects in Russian for Russian-speakers is Ali Evteev’s “Medina”,

The network of alumni of the universities of Cairo, Damascus (moved to Istanbul), Medina and others strongly promotes Islamic knowledge...

I think it makes sense to speak about gradual formation of a transboundary Russian-speaking Islamic ummah. Even the Afghans in Odessa and Jordanians in Vinnytsya read and listen khurbahs in their mosques in Russian.

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MADINA181
Apr. 13, 10:07
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.
Based on my observations, migrants in the West explain consolidation of their religious identity with the fear that their children can “blend” into a foreign culture. Furthermore, they consider it as a way of sticking together with their “people”. They say the feeling is particularly strong when they are far from Chechnya.
Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 10:08
Comment by Irina Starodubrovskaya: 

Perhaps this is an isolated example, but it proves the inapplicability of ideological stereotypes to assessment of Islamic activism. Secular educational projects, implemented by Muslims in Makhachkala and in their home villages represented a very interesting aspect of activity of non-traditional Islamic networks in Dagestan. The understanding of high importance of secular knowledge is a hallmark of one part (not all) of non-traditional Muslims, and it showed in practice. Members of rural communities in Makhachkala organized different projects to support education in their home villages. The support included personnel training, arrangement of skill contests, etc. Best practices were then applied in other villages. In Makhachkala, Muslims opened education centres with the focus on learning foreign languages (including English) and other secular subjects. Unfortunately, reaction of authorities to such projects was conditioned not by their content, but by the fact that they were arranged by informal Islamic networks. Many projects were subject to serious administrative pressure and closed despite having the obviously positive effect on development of human resources in the republic.

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Anna Glyants
Apr. 13, 10:09
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in the home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.
Perhaps it would be useful to specify the subject of our discussion. What is “Muslim activism” in the predominantly Muslim region? In other words, what are distinctive features that allow us differentiating Muslim activism from non-Muslim one in the Caucasus? I suggest differentiating two instances of Muslim activism.

First, affiliation to Islam can be articulated by Muslim activists themselves. For example, participants of charity organizations created under religious organizations can one way or another relate (frame) targeted activities of their organizations with Islamic values in their public statements. In particular, in Dagestan there are both charity foundations functioning under the SDMD and foundations comprised of Salafi Muslims.

There are even more vivid examples of such activism in the sphere of educational projects, including numerous Arabian learning initiatives, not to mention informal Islamic education.

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches.

In terms of social movement theory, in the first case Islam is appealed to through framing (purposeful positioning of certain activities in accordance with Islam). In the second case, we see appealing to certain opportunities opened by membership in the Muslim community, namely, organizational and regulatory resources. Finally, it should be noted that such division is not always strict: some forms of activism may refer to both categories (for instance, Muslim human rights projects).

moderator
moderator
Apr. 13, 10:10
We have a question from the Caucasus Knot group in Odnoklassniki.. We ask the participants to respond.

I’ve noticed lately that more women in the North Caucasus have been wearing headscarves, i.e. have become more religious. What do you think are the reasons?
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Evgeny Ivanov
Apr. 13, 10:10
The report mentions reislamization among labor migrants, especially those from Central Asia. I'd like to add that these are mainly young people, born after the collapse of the Soviet Union. That is, they underwent reislamization in their home countries. Labor migrants from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan mainly come from more conservative rural areas, affected by these processes more than any other regions. That is why I’d rather speak not about reislamization, but about 1) maintenance of religious commitment and 2) inclusion in a community, where Islam strengthens interpersonal relations and mutual support among people surviving in a foreign country. It was also mentioned that in Russia Muslim migrants from Central Asia did not undergo reislamization. Yet, they underwent radicalization while joining military operations in the Middle East. In this connection, keeping in mind cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the KGB in Soviet times, one might assume that state-linked ecclesiastical institutions act like watchdogs.
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denis sokolov
Apr. 13, 10:10
Regarding forms of mutual assistance within the Muslim community, to me, one of the most interesting events is construction of mosques and wells in Africa (Niger) by Abu Umar Sasitlinskiy and his fund. This is a kind of a mix of Islamic internationalism and consequences of retaliatory policy of Russian law-enforcers.
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Muhammad Abu Xamza
Apr. 13, 10:11
The reason is that the internal level of religious consciousness starts reaching the external one.
achmady
achmady
Apr. 13, 10:12
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in the home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.
Muslim identity becomes more significant in migration. Much is being done for halal procurement, first of all as far as food is concerned. For example, in the north, informal Muslim networks are engaged in supplying halal meat and other products from home countries. The jamaat helps to transport bodies of the deceased to home countries. They also develop educational projects, including those in the sphere of high technologies. Thus, in Novy Urengoy, young Muslims have developed Android and iOS app Namazvdom teaching prayer rules.
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MAGOMED SUNZHENSKY
Apr. 13, 10:12
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in the home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.
Charity is a common practice in home countries. Today it has a modern form (charity funds). “Non-traditional” Muslims are more advanced in this term, although the traditional practice of zakat or donations through mosques or imams is not less effective. However, traditional believers also started to set up such funds, following the trend, and the authorities immediately took advantage of this, since television is important part their PR campaigns. The question is how this can be reconciled with inadvisability of making show out of Sadaqah.     
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 10:14
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark. 

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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 10:14
Quotation: DENIS SOKOLOV Regarding forms of mutual assistance within the Muslim community, to me, one of the most interesting events, is construction of mosques and wells in Africa (Niger) by Abu Umar Sasitlinskiy and his fund. This is a kind of a mix of Islamic internationalism and consequences of retaliatory policy of Russian law-enforcers.
In reality, there are not only Abu Umar’s projects. This practice is spreading. Similar projects are organized by Muslims in Tatarstan and by Chechen communities abroad. There is a feeling that globality of the Islamic community grows and becomes more important for ordinary Muslims.
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denis sokolov
Apr. 13, 10:15
Quotation: MODERATOR We have a question from the Caucasus Knot group in Odnoklassniki. We ask the participants to respond. I’ve noticed lately that more women in the North Caucasus have been wearing headscarves, i.e. have become more religious. What do you think are the reasons?
It is connected with the spread of Islam and the fact that wearing hijab gradually turns into a norm for a majority of people in urban and rural areas, especially in Ingushetia (where it is almost a public consensus), in Chechnya (it is supported by authorities) and in Dagestan (it is a norm for many communities).
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 10:16
In fact, active participation in public processes is a duty of Muslims. That is why it shows both in individual and collective forms.
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Madina181
Apr. 13, 10:16
Quotation: MODERATOR We have a question from the Caucasus Knot group in Odnoklassniki. We ask the participants to respond. I’ve noticed lately that more women in the North Caucasus have been wearing headscarves, i.e. have become more religious. What do you think are the reasons?
It is difficult to correlate a headscarf with adherence to a religion in everyday practice. But we have to admit that strengthening of the religious factor reflects on women’s appearance. Some wear the scarfs out of religious convictions, others because of public pressure, and the rest do it because they have less alternatives due to a very strong involvement of administrative resources.
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Anne Le Huerou
Apr. 13, 10:17
Quotation: Madina181
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in the home countris? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.
Based on my observations, migrants in the West explain consolidation of their religious identity with the fear that their children can “blend” into a foreign culture. Furthermore, they consider it as a way of sticking together with their “people”. They say the feeling is particularly strong when they are far from Chechnya. Yes indeed, but I think there also should be influence of Muslim communities of host countries, influence of political context and attitude to different forms of Islam in these countries. I wonder whether it would be correct to speak about European Russian-speaking Islam.
Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 10:19
The question of informal Caucasian Muslim networks operating outside the spiritual directorates is an integral part of the agenda of our discussion. What forms of Muslim self-organization exist outside the spiritual directorates? I ask our European colleagues to tell about informal Muslim networks in European countries.
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 10:20
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA The question of informal Caucasian Muslim networks operating outside the spiritual directorates is an integral part of the agenda of our discussion. What forms of Muslim self-organization exist outside the spiritual directorates? I ask our European colleagues to tell about informal Muslim networks in European countries.
I think there are no spiritual directorates in Europe.
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Anne Le Huerou
Apr. 13, 10:20
Quotation: Anne Le Huerou
Quotation: Madina181
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in the home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new. Мадина 181 : Based on my observations, migrants in the West explain consolidation of their religious identity with the fear that their children can “blend” into a foreign culture. Furthermore, they consider it as a way of sticking together with their “people”. They say the feeling is particularly strong when they are far from Chechnya.
Yes indeed, but I think there also should be influence of Muslim communities of host countries, influence of political context and attitude to different forms of Islam in these countries. I wonder whether it would be correct to speak about European Russian-speaking Islam.
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Evgeny Ivanov
Apr. 13, 10:24
I’d not speak about some “special” forms of self-organization of Muslims. They use the same forms as other communities, such as educational projects, assistance to needy families (raising funds for medical treatment, sending kids from large families to school), family day care centres, procurement of halal products, etc.
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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 10:27
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA The question of informal Caucasian Muslim networks operating outside the spiritual directorates is an integral part of the agenda of our discussion. What forms of Muslim self-organization exist outside the spiritual directorates? I ask our European colleagues to tell about informal Muslim networks in European countries.
I think there are no spiritual directorates in Europe.
There are no spiritual departments, but there are adherents of different branches of Islam there (including those considered as traditional or official Islam in Russia). Sometimes, we can trace a connection with Russia’s official Islamic structures and government bodies. That’s why conflicts within Russian’s Islamic community often are mirrored within expatriate communities, sometimes in a modified form.
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denis sokolov
Apr. 13, 10:27
I can’t claim to giving full information, but I’d like to name some online and offline networks formed by spiritual leaders or influential preachers, beginning with YouTube and Telegram bloggers with dozens of thousands of subscribers and ending with google-sheikhs popular with several hundreds of people from a concrete village or a religious community.

These are charity networks and Muslim human rights organizations, such as Vayfond in Sweden.

More Russian-speaking Islamic educational projects have been launched abroad lately, including Hajibei School in Odessa, organized by Dagestanis, who have gathered children from Tatarstan, Dagestan, Crimea and other places.

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Madina181
Apr. 13, 10:28
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark. 

I completely agree with you. I think “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 10:28
Quotation: Madina181
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark.  

I completely agree with you. I think “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
It depends on what they mean by integration… 

They normally mean assimilation.

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John Galt
Apr. 13, 10:29
A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

"I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?"

moderator
moderator
Apr. 13, 10:30
We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Vkontakte.We ask the participants to respond.

How often do “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam cooperate? Can you give some examples of such cooperation?
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Mark Youngman
Apr. 13, 10:31
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA The question of informal Caucasian Muslim networks operating outside the spiritual directorates is an integral part of the agenda of our discussion. What forms of Muslim self-organization exist outside the spiritual directorates? I ask our European colleagues to tell about informal Muslim networks in European countries.
Although I’m not an expert in this issue, if we mean forms of self-organization (i.e. not some formal organizations), forms of self-organization of Muslims and non-Muslims do not differ much in Europe. In other words, I disagree with the wording of the question.
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Магомед Сунженский
Apr. 13, 10:31
Quotation: ANNE LE HUEROU
Quotation: ANNE LE HUEROU
Quotation: MADINA181
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Question for all speakers – please, tell about activism of Caucasian Muslims in and outside the region: how it manifests and develops. Labor migration and communication with home countries: how do they maintain Islamic identity? What projects – educational, charity, etc. – are implemented in the home countries? Forms of Muslim synergies: traditional and new.
Yes indeed, but I think there also should be influence of Muslim communities of host countries, influence of political context and attitude to different forms of Islam in these countries. I wonder whether it would be correct to speak about Europe-based Russian-speaking Islam.
Perhaps, this is correct in relation to the first flows of Muslims from the former USSR. However, new generations of expatriates, well integrated in host countries, will use the Russian language more seldom (at least because they don’t know it well) and will more often use languages of respective host countries and maybe English for communication within transboundary networks. 
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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 10:32
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: Madina181
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark.  

I completely agree with you. I think this “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
It depends on what they mean by integration… 

They normally mean assimilation.

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but does all this somehow reflect the dilution of conflict of identities in the Muslim community? Ideological differences are less important than before, aren’t they.
Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 10:32
Quotation: MARK YOUNGMAN
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA The question of informal Caucasian Muslim networks operating outside the spiritual directorates is an integral part of the agenda of our discussion. What forms of Muslim self-organization exist outside the spiritual directorates? I ask our European colleagues to tell about informal Muslim networks in European countries.
Although I’m not an expert in this issue, if we mean forms of self-organization (i.e. not some formal organizations), forms of self-organization of Muslims and non-Muslims do not differ much in Europe. In other words, I disagree with the wording of the question.
If they don’t differ much, what their self-organization is like? Maybe you could give some concrete examples...
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 10:33
Quotation: IRINA STARODUBROVSKAYA
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: MADINA181
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark.  

I completely agree with you. I think this “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
It depends on what they mean by integration… 

They normally mean assimilation.

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but does all this somehow reflect the dilution of conflict of identities in the Muslim community? Ideological differences are less important than before, aren’t they.
 What do you mean by the dilution of conflict of identities?
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MUHAMMAD ABU XAMZA
Apr. 13, 10:35
Let me slightly wander from the subject and say regarding the mentioned situation of Russia’s Muslims that the “umbrella” Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia is a fake having no support among jamaats and Muslims and being promoted in opposition to the CMR.

I also have to point to the incorrect description of Muslims of Dagestan. It’s not a secret that Ihvan-i Muslimin party is a political movement and it would be wrong to reckon its members among any religious movements or particularly among the ideological opponents - Salafis. The groups adhering to Ihvan-i Muslimin’s ideas are moderate traditional groups that opt for political development without the use of military force, and radical groups, believing that development through peace is impossible.

Speaking about Salafis, I need to mention that many of those who are called Salafis and even those who call themselves Salafis are not Salafis at all.

True Salafis come for maintaining the original traditions and perceptions of Islamic practices of first generations of Muslims. At the same time, they live a modern life and take into consideration the reality and the society in which they exist, and their life is closely linked with learning and Islamic scholars. The mentioned Madhalists is just a small group that is hardly represented in Dagestan and the Caucasus in general. Sunni Muslims make up the major portion of Muslims in Dagestan, the Caucasus and Russia. They do not stick to some concrete groups, nor do they follow any particular madhhab. They are mainly guided by leaders they trust.

This can be explained by a very low level of literacy about religion and restricted access to scholars.

There is plenty of information, but knowledge is the privilege of a few.

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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 10:35
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: IRINA STARODUBROVSKAYA
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: MADINA181
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark.  

I completely agree with you. I think this “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
It depends on what they mean by integration… 

They normally mean assimilation.

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but does all this somehow reflect the dilution of conflict of identities in the Muslim community? Ideological differences are less important than before, aren’t they.
 What do you mean by the dilution of conflict of identities?
It is even worse than before that now the process is described in terms of Sufis and Salafis. Opinions have become increasingly diverse in the Islamic community, while ideological aspects of the conflict between “traditionalists” and “non-traditionalists” have toned down (which is particularly obvious in the North-East Caucasus).
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 10:36
Quotation: IRINA STARODUBROVSKAYA
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: MADINA181
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark.  

I completely agree with you. I think this “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
It depends on what they mean by integration… 

They normally mean assimilation.

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but does all this somehow reflect the dilution of conflict of identities in the Muslim community? Ideological differences are less important than before, aren’t they.
I’m not sure whether we can speak about a trend, but there are examples of mobilization, when ideological differences go into the background. The first example that jumps to my mind is the Kumyk mobilization. This is a rather specific case, in which Sheikh Muhammad Muhtar Kyahulawi played a decisive role in “reconciling” adherents of different branches of Islam. 
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Madina181
Apr. 13, 10:36
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?”

As far as polygamy is concerned, if we mean societies, where a woman enters a family as a “second wife”, her status is determined in traditional societies and she is protected. I am strongly against polygamy, but not because of “living in Russia”; in Russia men often have mistresses as second wives, and do you see any significant difference?
achmady
achmady
Apr. 13, 10:36
Quotation: MODERATOR We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Vkontakte. We ask the participants to respond.Quotation: MODERATOR Quotation: MODERATOR We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Vkontakte. We ask the participants to respond. How often do “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam cooperate? Can you give some examples of such cooperation?
The two groups we’ve constructed here certainly are not in fierce opposition to each other. Many youth leaders quite effectively settle issues with “official” imams and muftis. In some towns and regions there is only one mosque, and locals have to negotiate such issues as the arrangement of iftars during fast. All this would be impossible without cooperation.
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Muhammad Abu Xamza
Apr. 13, 10:36
Let me apologize in advance for my late comments. This is my first participation in such a discussion and I had no time to prepare)
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tushta
Apr. 13, 10:37
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA The question of informal Caucasian Muslim networks operating outside the spiritual directorates is an integral part of the agenda of our discussion. What forms of Muslim self-organization exist outside the spiritual directorates? I ask our European colleagues to tell about informal Muslim networks in European countries.
Chechen charity association Vayfond has opened in Sweden. Among other things, the association raises funds for students, who study Islam in Egypt (they also collected books for such students). They often hold fund-raising campaigns to help needy refugees and try to provide legal aid to people facing possible deportation or extradition to Russia.  
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Evgeny Ivanov
Apr. 13, 10:37
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?”

Polygamy is not allowed under the Russian laws. Furthermore, the laws protect against domestic violence. The question is whether the laws are being enforced, i.e. whether local police and courts act within the confines of the laws. If a man marries second/third/fourth wife according to Shariah, then the clergy that takes up the right to effect such a marriage, should guarantee protection of those wives.
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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 10:37
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: IRINA STARODUBROVSKAYA
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: MADINA181
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark.  

I completely agree with you. I think this “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
It depends on what they mean by integration… 

They normally mean assimilation.

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but does all this somehow reflect the dilution of conflict of identities in the Muslim community? Ideological differences are less important than before, aren’t they.
I’m not sure whether we can speak about a trend, but there are examples of mobilization, when ideological differences go into the background. The first example that jumps to my mind is the Kumyk mobilization. This is a rather specific case, in which Sheikh Muhammad Muhtar Kyahulawi played a decisive role in “reconcile” adherents of different branches of Islam.  
The protests in Ingushetia represent an even more vivid example of such mobilization.
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 10:38
Quotation: ACHMADY
Quotation: MODERATOR We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Vkontakte. We ask the participants to respond.How often do “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam cooperate? Can you give some examples of such cooperation?
The two groups we’ve constructed here certainly are not in fierce opposition to each other. Many youth leaders quite effectively settle issues with “official” imams and muftis. In some towns and regions there is only one mosque, and locals have to negotiate the arrangement of iftars during fast. All this would be impossible without cooperation.
I fully agree that boundaries between the two groups are rather flexible (and have various degree of flexibility).
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 10:39
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?”

Polygamy is not allowed under the Russia laws. Furthermore, the laws protect against domestic violence. The question is whether the laws are being enforced, i.e. whether local police and courts act within the confines of the laws. If a man marries second/third/fourth wife according to Shariah, then the clergy that takes up the right to effect such a marriage, should guarantee protection of those wives.
It would be wrong to say that polygamy is prohibited in practice.

It was prohibited during the communist regime. Now it is not prohibited, but is not registered by the State.

moderator
moderator
Apr. 13, 10:41
We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Facebook. We ask the participants to respond.

I’ve nothing to do with politics and religion, but I wonder, has Islam been already divided into traditional and non-traditional? Or maybe into active and passive))?
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Anna Glyants
Apr. 13, 10:42
цитата: Irina Starodubrovskaya
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: IRINA STARODUBROVSKAYA
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: MADINA181
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS

Second, Caucasian Muslim activism may involve types of civic mobilization, formulating their objectives without the use of Islamic terms, but using Islamic practices as an important organizational, consolidating and/or regulatory resource (for instance, appealing to Shariah during conflict resolution). Such activism can be easily integrated in community or national mobilization projects, with participants of the projects not necessarily adhering to the same branches of Islam.

Corrected my previous remark.  

I completely agree with you. I think this “civic consolidation” among Muslims will be further enhancing, and this process will give new momentum to Muslims’ integration with civil society in their countries of residence.
It depends on what they mean by integration… 

They normally mean assimilation.

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but does all this somehow reflect the dilution of conflict of identities in the Muslim community? Ideological differences are less important than before, aren’t they.
I’m not sure whether we can speak about a trend, but there are examples of mobilization, when ideological differences go into the background. The first example that jumps to my mind is the Kumyk mobilization. This is a rather specific case, in which Sheikh Muhammad Muhtar Kyahulawi played a decisive role in “reconcile” adherents of different branches of Islam.  
The protests in Ingushetia represent an even more vivid example of such mobilization.
Thank you! I didn’t analyse the protest from the point of view of religious affiliation of its participants. This is indeed a very significant (and signature) example.  
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Muhammad Abu Xamza
Apr. 13, 10:43
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ACHMADY
Quotation: moderator We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Vkontakte. We ask the participants to respond. How often do “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam cooperate? Can you give some examples of such cooperation?
The two groups we’ve constructed here certainly are not in fierce opposition to each other. Many youth leaders quite effectively settle issues with “official” imams and muftis. In some towns and regions, there is only one mosque, and locals have to negotiate the arrangement of iftars during fast. All this would be impossible without cooperation.
I fully agree that boundaries between the two groups are rather flexible (and have various degree of flexibility).
One example is a jointly prepared issue of the Islam magazine and the second is a jumah in Makhachkala mosque attended by different groups.
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denis sokolov
Apr. 13, 10:43
What is also interesting is the mixture of Islamic and nationalist activism we’ve been witnessing for a couple of years. Nationalist (ethnic) activism is mostly practiced by Muslims of Salafi aqidah. I think the process of gradual sophistication and maturing of Islamic and ethnic networks is caused on the one hand by the need for ethnic identity in forming a clear and universal jurisdiction, and on the other – by the need of Islamic groups for discriminating between insiders and outsiders while organizing enforcement.  
Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 10:44
Quotation: MODERATOR We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Facebook. We ask the participants to respond. I’ve nothing to do with politics and religion, but I wonder, has Islam been already divided into traditional and non-traditional? Or maybe into active and passive))?
There are other platforms for such remarks. If you show disrespect towards the audience again, I’ll ban you.
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Evgeny Ivanov
Apr. 13, 10:44
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?”

Polygamy is not allowed under the Russian laws. Furthermore, the laws protect against domestic violence. The question is whether the laws are being enforced, i.e. whether local police and courts act within the confines of the laws. If a man marries second/third/fourth wife according to Shariah, then the clergy that takes up the right to effect a such marriage, should guarantee protection of those wives.
It would be wrong to say that polygamy is prohibited in practice.

It was prohibited during the communist regime. Now it is not prohibited, but is not registered by the State.

There can be only one marriage stamp in a passport. It’s up to people to decide the rest. If all the parties agree unofficial marriage, it is admissible. The main criterion here is the absence of any coercion by parents, husband, etc.
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MAGOMED SUNZHENSKY
Apr. 13, 10:45
Quotation: ACHMADY
Quotation: moderator We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Vkontakte. We ask the participants to respond.How often do “traditional” and “non-traditional” Islam cooperate? Can you give some examples of such cooperation?.
The two groups we’ve constructed here certainly are not in fierce opposition to each other. Many youth leaders quite effectively settle issues with “official” imams and muftis. In some towns and regions there is only one mosque, and locals have to negotiate the arrangement of iftars during fast. All this would be impossible without cooperation.
And the last example, not quite realized yet, is cooperation of a significant number of “new” Muslims, against the will of most of their “sheikhs”, with the official muftiyat (opposed to the republic’s authorities, and therefore “unofficial”?) within the framework of the protest movement in Ingushetia.  
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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 10:45
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?”

Polygamy is not allowed under the Russian laws. Furthermore, the laws protect against domestic violence. The question is whether the laws are being enforced, i.e. whether local police and courts act within the confines of the laws. If a man marries second/third/fourth wife according to Shariah, then the clergy that takes up the right to effect such a marriage, should guarantee protection of those wives.
It would be wrong to say that polygamy is prohibited in practice.

It was prohibited during the communist regime. Now it is not prohibited, but is not registered by the State.

There can be only one marriage stamp in a passport. It’s up to people to decide the rest. If all the parties agree for an unofficial marriage, it is admissible. The main criterion here is the absence of any coercion by parents, husband, etc.
A stamp in a passport hardly correlates to a marriage in the Caucasus.
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Muhammad Abu Xamza
Apr. 13, 10:47
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?”

Polygamy is not allowed under the Russian laws. Furthermore, the laws protect against domestic violence. The question is whether the laws are being enforced, i.e. whether local police and courts act within the confines of the laws. If a man marries second/third/fourth wife according to Shariah, then the clergy that takes up the right to effect such a marriage, should guarantee protection of those wives.
It would be wrong to say that polygamy is prohibited in practice.

It was prohibited during the communist regime. Now it is not prohibited, but is not registered by the State.

ШThere can be only one marriage stamp in a passport. It’s up to people to decide the rest. If all the parties agree for an unofficial marriage, it is admissible. The main criterion here is the absence of any coercion by parents, husband, etc.
In practice, many women prefer the second wife’s status, as first wives have to undertake many responsibilities related to family ties.
achmady
achmady
Apr. 13, 10:47
Quotation: DENIS SOKOLOV What is also interesting is the mixture of Islamic and nationalist activism we’ve been witnessing for a couple of years. Nationalist (ethnic) activism is mostly practiced by Muslims of Salafi aqidah. I think the process of gradual sophistication and maturing of Islamic and ethnic networks is caused on the one hand by the need for ethnic identity in forming a clear and universal jurisdiction, and on the other – by the need of Islamic groups for discriminating between insiders and outsiders while organizing enforcement.  
I agree with Denis. This particularly shows in migration.
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Aude Merlin
Apr. 13, 10:47
I don’t specialize in Islam in North Caucasian communities/diasporas in Europe, but judging from what I see, it is obvious that religion is very important for the North Caucasian communities living in Europe. For example, look at the Chechens. Yet, this does not mean that this happens through some formal or informal self-organization. There are several overlapping aspects there: sometimes, national and religious identities overlap. For example, in some public organizations or cultural centres, especially those for children, they teach the Chechen language, culture, dances, and at the same time, teach Arabian and Quran recitation. Some Chechens prefer not to communicate with other Chechens for certain reasons and to learn the Islamic practices on their own. Islam remains a personal matter to them.
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Madina181
Apr. 13, 10:48
Quotation: EVGENY IVANOV
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy where others have no protection at all.?”

Polygamy is not allowed under the Russian laws. Furthermore, the laws protect against domestic violence. The question is whether the laws are being enforced, i.e. whether local police and courts act within the confines of the laws. If a man marries second/third/fourth wife according to Shariah, then the clergy that takes up the right to effect such a marriage, should guarantee protection of those wives.
Unfortunately, domestic violence, and especially gender violence, is a crucial problem of matrimonial relations in Russia. According to official data, 36,000 women underwent life-threatening domestic violence in 2017-2018 only. Law-enforcers are reluctant to respond to domestic violence reports, saying they don’t want to interfere into “family affairs”, so the problem is toxic indeed and needs to be discussed separately.
moderator
moderator
Apr. 13, 10:49
We’ve received a question from the Caucasian Knot’s group in Facebook. We ask the participants to respond.

What is the attitude of representatives of traditional Islam to non-traditional Islamic organizations?
>
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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 10:49
Quotation: JOHN GALT A question from an Instagram subscriber. Original spelling left unchanged.

“I have a question. What is the attitude of traditional believers to the fact that some fathers think they have to force their children (under 18 years) to religion even if they have to use threats and violence for this. second question. why do you, while living in Russia, allow polygamy, where second wives are totally unprotected.?”

As to children, judging from interviews with Muslims, there are two attitudes there. According to the first one, a head of a family is responsible for its members and has the right to force children to practice Islam (I have no information about admissibility of violence). The second attitude is free from forcing into religion. Parents can demonstrate advantages of Islam to children without forcing them to practice it.
Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 10:49
And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms. 

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ALEXEI GUNYA
Apr. 13, 10:50
Many Caucasian Muslims moved to different countries, regions and even Russia’s provinces not because they wanted to, but because they had to support their families. Following migrants in remote regions (Bryansk, Smolensk oblasts and others), I noticed that initially there is no apparent division between them. Meanwhile, in big cities and adjacent areas (Moscow, Astrakhan Oblast and others), where large groups of Muslims live, we can see some signs of leadership and some hierarchy being shaped. Division appears only where there is competition. Perhaps, this is the main point of the current division into traditionalists and “reformers” (if I can put it this way).
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Абу Увайс Хутави
Apr. 13, 10:51
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms. 
I think the relationship will be improving, including through different joint projects. There will be a certain divide though between pro-government and non-progovernment structures.
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Muhammad Abu Xamza
Apr. 13, 10:51
Regarding Islam in Russia and division and examination of different groups, I’d like to say that no other denomination undergoes such a careful division and close examination. With this in mind, it makes sense to ask why they place that much importance on these issues.
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Карина
Apr. 13, 10:53
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Quotation: MARK YOUNGMAN
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA The question of informal Caucasian Muslim networks operating outside the spiritual directorates is an integral part of the agenda of our discussion. What forms of Muslim self-organization exist outside the spiritual directorates? I ask our European colleagues to tell about informal Muslim networks in European countries.
Although I’m not an expert in this issue, if we mean forms of self-organization (i.e. not some formal organizations), forms of self-organization of Muslims and non-Muslims do not differ much in Europe. In other words, I disagree with the wording of the question.
If they don’t differ much, what the self-organization is like? Maybe you could give some concrete examples...

Self-organization is going equally through social media, friendly and family ties. A common thing for all these groups is that they create a space “beyond the State” and commercial structures, where all people can communicate and form a collective identity. Universities in the UK hosting numerous voluntary associations and societies can serve as a good example of this. These groups may have different goals, but they have similar ways of attracting new members and ways of operation.  

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Evgeny Ivanov
Apr. 13, 10:54
Again, a lot will depend on who better meets the demands of ordinary Muslims. If “official” Islam continues to cede positions to informal networks in this sphere, as was mentioned by my colleagues, than it risks losing its people; and this will no longer be a matter of hierarchy, but a matter of pure utility.
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MAGOMED SUNZHENSKY
Apr. 13, 10:56
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms.
In a few words, “unofficial” Islam will become more “official” over time, because this meets the interests of the authorities and leaders of unofficial communities too. In the event of a crisis, like the one in Ingushetia, new conditions appear for a quicker rapprochement.
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Irina Starodubrovskaya
Apr. 13, 10:56
Quotation: MUHAMMAD ABU XAMZA Regarding Islam in Russia and division and examination of different groups, I’d like to say that no other denomination undergoes such a careful division and close examination. With this in mind, it makes sense to ask why they place that much importance on these issues.
I think the reason is that internal Islamic conflicts determine many aspects both on the domestic and international agenda. The situation in the Middle East and migration flows make the issues we discuss more important. Had we conducted our research during the protestant reformation, we would have focused on Christianity, I guess.
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denis sokolov
Apr. 13, 10:57
I think there is no stable structure there; everything is very agile. Sometimes it depends on political environment, sometimes – on personal qualities of religious leaders on both sides. Thus in Dagestan and Chechnya, those groups were at an armed conflict for a long time. In North Ossetia, largely thanks to Khajimurat Gatsalov, it is difficult to draw a line between formal and informal Islam. In Ingushetia, different preachers and the muftiyat cooperated with the authorities differently at varying times. During the recent protests, official religious structures and informal religious groups intermingled so much that the demarcation line between the authorities and the opposition stopped to be relevant for discriminating between official and unofficial Islam.
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 10:58
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms.
I think the relationship will be improving, including through different joint projects. There will be a certain divide though between pro-government and non-progovernment structures.
Apart from joint projects, we can also mentioned examples of trade-offs on certain religious practices. Thus, I examined a case of a village, where most of believers recognize the mufti’s authority, but they stopped performing the Friday midday prayer (salat al-jum’ah) after they tested people for knowing Makhraj. Thus the believers made sure that the salat al-jum’ah criteria indeed were observed (there were more than 60 “ulems” in the village). This allowed cancelling the midday prayer without causing any conflicts in the jamaat.

 I hope my colleagues can give more examples.

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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 11:00
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationships develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms. 
I think the relationship will be improving, including through different joint projects. There will be a certain divide though between pro-government and non-progovernment structures.
Apart from joint projects, we can also mentioned examples of trade-offs on certain religious practices. Thus, I examined a case of a village, where most of believers recognize the mufti’s authority, but they stopped performing the Friday midday prayer (salat al-jum’ah) after they tested people for knowing Makhraj. Thus the believers made sure that the salat al-jum’ah criteria indeed were observed (there were more than 60 “ulems” in the village). This allowed cancelling the midday prayer without causing any conflicts in the jamaat.

 I hope if my colleagues can give more examples.

They have also cancelled the Friday midday prayer in Makhachkala.  

In fact, many conflicts in religious practice can be resolved this way, and of course, it is important to recognize the right of believers to diverse approaches.

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Muhammad Abu Xamza
Apr. 13, 11:00
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms. 
I think the relationship will be improving, including through different joint projects. There will be a certain divide though between pro-government and not pro-government structures.
The events of the last 20 years have become clear in the light of the issue of “officiality” and “loyalty”, since the watch-listing practice aims to divide Muslims into loyal and disloyal, and although they mess it up badly, as a result, we have the list including many extra-muftiyat Sufi imams and traditionalist people with dissenting views.
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ALEXEI GUNYA
Apr. 13, 11:00
A lot depends on regional authorities. I think that unification and suppression of diversity among believers leads to a deadlock.
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 11:02
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms.
I think the relationship will be improving, including through different joint projects. There will be a certain divide though between pro-government and not pro-government structures.
Apart from joint projects, we can also mentioned examples of trade-offs on certain religious practices. Thus, I examined a case of a village, where most of believers recognize the mufti’s authority, but they stopped performing the Friday midday prayer (salat al-jum’ah) after they tested people for knowing Makhraj. Thus the believers made sure that the salat al-jum’ah criteria indeed were observed (there were more than 60 “ulems” in the village). This allowed cancelling the midday prayer without causing any conflicts in the jamaat.

 I hope if my colleagues can give more examples.

They have also cancelled the Friday midday prayer in Makhachkala.  

In fact, many conflicts in religious practice can be resolved this way, and of course, it is important to recognize the right of believers to diverse approaches.

Thank you for such an important example! When did they cancel the midday prayer everywhere in Makhachkala?
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 11:05
цитата: Irina Starodubrovskaya
Quotation: MUHAMMAD ABU XAMZA Regarding Islam in Russia and division and examination of different groups, I’d like to say that no other denomination undergoes such a careful division and close examination.

With this in mind, it makes sense to ask why they place that much importance on these issues.  

I think the reason is that internal Islamic conflicts determine many aspects both on the domestic and international agenda. The situation in the Middle East and migration flows make the issues we discuss more important. Had we conducted our research during the protestant reformation, we would have focused on Christianity, I guess.
I agree that political agenda (both domestic and international) plays an important role here, but if we talk about scientific aspects, we need to understand that social sciences often study process inside groups and hardly ever examine conditionality of those groups (which is certainly a shame).  

Besides, I’m afraid we have to admit that disciplinary approaches in sociology of religion sometimes disregard specifics of organization among Muslims (to put it briefly and very conventionally – the lack of clear hierarchic institutions that possibly form boundaries of the groups).

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ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Apr. 13, 11:06
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms.
I think the relationship will be improving, including through different joint projects. There will be a certain divide though between pro-government and non-pro-overnment structures.
Apart from joint projects, we can also mentioned examples of trade-offs on certain religious practices. Thus, I examined a case of a village, where most of believers recognize the mufti’s authority, but they stopped performing the Friday midday prayer (salat al-jum’ah) after they tested people for knowing Makhraj. Thus the believers made sure that the salat al-jum’ah criteria indeed were observed (there were more than 60 “ulems” in the village). This allowed cancelling the midday prayer without causing any conflicts in the jamaat.

 I hope if my colleagues can give more examples.

They have also cancelled Friday midday prayer in Makhachkala.  

In fact, many conflicts in religious practice can be resolved this way, and of course, it is important to recognize the right of believers to diverse approaches.

Thank you for such an important example! When did they cancel the midday prayer everywhere in Makhachkala?
A few months ago.  

Before they did it, they started making long breaks for those not performing the midday prayer on Fridays to be able to leave mosques without disturbing others.

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Muhammad Abu Xamza
Apr. 13, 11:06
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: ANNA GLYANTS
Quotation: ABU UVAYS HUTAVI
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA And finally, here is the last question in our discussion. There is a certain structure of relationship between “official” and “unofficial” Islam in the North Caucasus. How will these relationship develop? I admit in advance conditionality of these terms. 
I think the relationship will be improving, including through different joint projects. There will be a certain divide though between pro-government and not pro-government structures.
Apart from joint projects, we can also mentioned examples of trade-offs on certain religious practices. Thus, I examined a case of a village, where most of believers recognize the mufti’s authority, but they stopped performing the Friday midday prayer (salat al-jum’ah) after they tested people for knowing Makhraj. Thus the believers made sure that the salat al-jum’ah criteria indeed were observed (there were more than 60 “ulems” in the village). This allowed cancelling the midday prayer without causing any conflicts in the jamaat.

 I hope if my colleagues can give more examples.

They have also cancelled salat al-jum’ah in Makhachkala.  

In fact, many conflicts in religious practice can be resolved this way, and of course, it is important to recognize the right of believers to diverse approaches.

Thank you for such an important example! When did they cancel the midday prayer everywhere in Makhachkala?
Sheikh Muhammad-Muhtar Babatov was the first to cancel it in Kyahulay mosque and other mosques under his jurisdiction and then the muftiyat in Makhachkala assumed the more moderate stand.
Наима Нефляшева
NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA
Apr. 13, 11:08
Dear colleagues and readers of the Caucasian Knot! Now we close our discussion. You can continue in social media and ask our speakers questions on this platform. The discussion will be summarized and posted in the form of a digest on my blog “North Caucasus through Centuries” on the Caucasian Knot.  

Thank you for the discussion and for your work. Special thanks to Ahmet Yarlykapov, who inspired my choice of the topic for discussion.

achmady
achmady
Apr. 13, 11:08
Quotation: NAIMA NEFLYASHEVA Dear colleagues and readers of the Caucasian Knot! Now we close our discussion. You can continue in social media and ask our speakers questions on this platform. The discussion will be summarized and posted in the form of a digest on my blog “North Caucasus through Centuries” on the Caucasian Knot. 

Thank you for the discussion and for your work. Special thanks to Ahmet Yarlykapov, who inspired my choice of the topic for discussion.

Naima, thanks for the productive discussion!!!
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ANNA GLYANTS
Apr. 13, 11:12
A special thanks to my colleagues for important information regarding the cancellation of the Friday midday prayer in Makhachkala.  

And many thanks to the MODERATOR and all speakers!